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Despite the importance of European Union negotiations, the majority of scholarly attention 
has not been directed towards the means by which policy is co-ordinated in Member 
States.  This article addresses one aspect of this gap by focusing upon the structures which 
existed for UK policy-making during the 1990-91 IGC negotiations. Particular emphasis is 
attached to the key role of officials, who often proved crucial to the extraction of 
compromises at the European level, and the manner by which policy was constrained by 
the inability of the Prime Minister to dominate Cabinet. 
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The completion of the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) negotiations at the 
December 1991 Maastricht European Council2 encouraged analysis of both the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) itself and the role played by Member States in its negotiation.3  
Little scholarly attention however has been paid to how policy was co-ordinated within 
individual Member States during the European Political Union (EPU) and Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) IGCs.  This article seeks to address this lacuna, by analysing the 
structures which existed for United Kingdom (UK) policy-making during the negotiations 
and the degree of Ministerial and official involvement.  Such analysis is particularly pertinent 
to the UK, where the government’s overall position was negative. It hoped to reach broad 
agreement on issues such as a stronger role for foreign policy co-ordination (through 
intergovernmental methods of co-operation), the introduction of the concept of subsidiarity, 
greater enforcement of EC legislation, and ensuring the European Parliament (EP) had a 
stronger non-legislative role.4  The government sought agreement also on points it objected 
to, such as greater usage of qualified majority voting (QMV), the introduction of a co-
decision legislative procedure for the EP, the development of social policy, the creation of 
an integrated defence force which might jeopardise the relationship with NATO, and the 
development of a single currency.5  
An examination of policy co-ordination helps to explain the outcome of the IGCs, 
where the UK obtained, inter-alia, an opt-out from the Social Chapter and the third stage 
of EMU, while accepting an increase in the power of the EP through a co-decision 
procedure and a commitment to a ‘common defence’ within a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP).6  The decision of the government to stand firm on some points 
while conceding ground on others can be explained only by examining the influence of 
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differing departments and government Ministers with regard to the topics for which they 
were responsible, and their relevance both to the IGC negotiations and the UK cause. 
Coverage is selective, focusing on the more important aspects, namely CFSP, institutional 
issues, social affairs and EMU.  Other matters certainly were of some moment in the talks, 
such as citizenship of the Union and the rights of citizens; the Committee of the Regions; 
and power for the European Court to impose fines on persistently offending Member 
States.  However, they were rarely as significant to the UK cause. 
I 
Policy co-ordination at the highest level: Cabinet 
Of the principal actors involved in the EPU negotiations, the Cabinet Office European 
Secretariat and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) receive particular attention. 
The former had the greater co-ordination role in the IGC, and EC policy generally, as it 
was where the government’s policy and tactics were settled. In this context the FCO, under 
Douglas Hurd’s leadership, was but one of many government departments that influenced 
meetings, though its remit was wider on specific issues such as CFSP.  Other significant 
departments included the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department for 
Employment (DfE), the Home Office and the Treasury, respectively controlled by Peter 
Lilley, Michael Howard, Kenneth Baker and Norman Lamont.  Their authority focused on 
specific points which fell within their remit, such as social policy, interior affairs and EMU. 
While they influenced other aspects of the talks, through participation in Cabinet 
committees, they did not share the FCO and Cabinet Office’s interest and concern as to 
how different parts of the negotiations gelled together. Thus, the latter two had a greater 
interest in, and influence on, a wider body of subjects. 
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Throughout 1990-91 the IGC did not receive particular attention at full Cabinet 
meetings unless specific problems needed to be discussed.  Lamont does not remember 
being asked any serious questions on EMU during Cabinet discussions, and those which 
arose tended to be very short.7  An EMU opt-out was Cabinet policy and therefore 
debates were of a technical nature which he considered colleagues would not have 
understood.8  In comparison, Howard convinced the Cabinet of the dangers which could 
effect British industry if the UK agreed to have a Social Chapter inside the Treaty.9  This 
shows that only issues of the greatest significance, and those backed by influential Cabinet 
members, were addressed.  Time restraints imposed on Cabinet meetings meant it was 
(and is) virtually impossible for detailed discussion to take place; meetings comprising some 
22 members are generally too large to be an effective forum for reaching agreement.  
Throughout 1991 Cabinet was overloaded with other topics, including the reform of the 
Community Charge, while the more imminent general election question loomed over all 
government policy.  The end product of these factors was that the IGC proved not to be 
the top Ministerial priority.  This affected the manner in which policy was resolved at the 
highest level.  Whereas Cabinet was united in its desire for the UK to obtain a single 
currency opt-out, decisions involving wider consultation were not taken at an early stage on 
complex matters.  Negotiators at official level were not provided with a full set of tactical 
instructions, only being made aware of general preferences which outlined what the 
government was against rather than how objectives could be obtained.  This reflected John 
Major’s unwillingness and inability to impose policy on colleagues whom he had recently 
been dependent upon for his elevation to Prime Minister.  
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Discussion of European policy was generally referred by Major to the appropriate 
Cabinet Committee, normally the Ministerial Sub-Committee on European Questions 
(OPD(E)).10  Otherwise, he would ask Hurd to write to other Ministers and officials in 
advance with a proposed government line.11  OPD(E), chaired by Hurd, was the principal 
discussion group at Ministerial level during the IGC, its term of reference being ‘to consider 
questions relating to the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union and to 
report as necessary to the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy’.12  The 
latter, (OPD), was its parent committee with a smaller membership comprising only six 
Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, who was not a member of OPD(E), and with a 
broader term of reference being ‘to keep under review the Government’s Defence and 
Overseas policy’.13  OPD, in its official composition, never discussed IGC issues, although 
towards the end of the negotiations an enlarged version had some discussions because 
Major wanted to exercise direct influence on government policy when the prioritisation of 
unsolved issues, which by definition tended to be more significant, were debated. Such 
meetings effectively comprised OPD(E) members, but with the Prime Minister in the chair 
instead of the Foreign Secretary.  This meant it was OPD(E) which highlighted the 
government’s objectives, such as the need for the ‘federal’ goal to be deleted from Article 
A, hostility towards the Social Chapter, and a desire for the concept of subsidiarity (Article 
3b) to be stated.   In the formation of these objectives no special committees were 
established for the duration of the negotiations, and there were no special seminars.14 
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Policy co-ordination at the highest level: Mandarins 
While Hurd chaired the key Ministerial committee during the IGC, the dominant official 
committee, particularly with regard to the IGC-EPU, was chaired by the head of the 
Cabinet Office European Secretariat, David Hadley. The co-ordinating committee of 
Deputy Secretaries, known as EQ(S) - European Questions (Steering) - serviced 
OPD(E).15  That the  issue of European policy was more effectively co-ordinated by the 
European Secretariat was noted by the 1977 Central Policy Review Staff Study of UK 
Overseas Representation. It adduced two reasons for preferring it to the FCO in this 
position; firstly that ‘..much of EEC business is about domestic issues of which the FCO 
has no direct experiences...’, and secondly that ‘...other departments would not want the 
FCO to have this function because they consider it is understandably inclined on occasion 
to advance the diplomatic and political interests of the UK as it sees them, at the expense of 
other UK interests’. Therefore, the conclusion was a ‘...non-departmental co-ordinator 
thus seems best....’16  This was emphasised by Brian Bender, the present head of the 
European Secretariat, when he noted the ‘...FCO has - and wishes to argue - a particular 
departmental point of view on EC issues. It could not do this and at the same time hold the 
ring in Whitehall’.17 
The very size of the European Secretariat, comprising 18 people including typists, 
meant it could not get involved in all aspects of the negotiations.  In comparison, the 
equivalent organisation in Paris, the SGCI, has a staff of over 100 people and accordingly a 
greater remit. Where issues were the prerogative of a particular department, and would 
thus not throw up inter-departmental differences which needed to be resolved,  the 
European Secretariat tended not to get involved, except peripherally.  It was not involved in 
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the monetary policy debate which was dealt with by the Treasury; or CFSP, which was 
mainly dealt with by the FCO; and was also not much involved in Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), since this mostly fell within the Home Office’s responsibilities. 
The European Secretariat also influenced policy through its chairmanship of EQ(O), the 
official committee which dealt with routine Community business.18 Its purpose, like other 
official Cabinet Committees, was to serve Members of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister 
in particular, by settling those issues which could be decided at an early stage of discussion.  
Otherwise, because the European Secretariat’s work involved dealing with Treaty 
language, legal advice was essential.  This included giving considered and authoritative 
determinations of legal matters arising in the IGC and other EC questions.  On more 
important issues, it involved chairing committees of legal advisers from different government 
departments to produce a co-ordinated view.   On issues where the legal position might 
bear on policy, policy makers as well as lawyers could be present.  The result of involving 
such officials in the creation of a common position was, as Wallace notes, ‘...to leave little 
leeway to individual departments or officials to depart from agreed lines of reasoning’.19 
But, if differences of opinion arose (or where questions were of such importance or political 
sensitivity that Ministers needed to consider them collectively), then its job was to isolate 
the questions and present them in the best possible light for discussion.  In that respect, it is 
unlike the Chancellery in Bonn, which exists to inject a view from the Chancellor through a 
policy-making role, partly a result of the loosely co-ordinated nature of European policy 
within Germany. The Cabinet Office is never in a position to force its position on other 
departments because of its co-ordinating role.20 
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Hadley’s specific job was to chair the more important meetings on the co-ordination of 
EC policy in general, and to brief the Prime Minister before every European Council.21  
One of the other main tasks he undertook was to support the Foreign Secretary’s personal 
representative on the EPU negotiations, Sir John Kerr,22  who was also the UK Permanent 
Representative to the EC.  This involved two roles, the first of which was policy adviser.  
The second was to ensure progress in the IGC could be presented to other government 
departments as being a consensus viewpoint, and not just the opinion of the FCO.  This 
was important because of the perception within Whitehall of a pro-European FCO, who 
with UK accession to the Community had begun to influence the affairs of other 
government departments.  Hennessy considered FCO diplomats had ‘...found a new place 
in the sun...’23 A manifestation of this was Kerr’s anxiety that Hadley should be involved in 
all aspects of the negotiations because he foresaw that, when difficulties arose, other 
government departments would more readily believe him, in conjunction with Hadley, on 
what was negotiable, than they would if he acted alone.24 
During the IGC Kerr had great influence as the principal official with detailed 
knowledge of both the Community negotiation process and the room for flexibility of other 
Member States.  His role was not just to carry out instructions from London, but to play a 
full part in discussing policy and tactics.  Throughout the conference the intention was for an 
agreed conclusion to be reached after consultation with relevant government departments, 
with the UK Permanent Representation (UKRep) providing advice on the feasibility of 
chosen approaches, as well as offering alternative solutions.  The formal contact between 
Kerr and Whitehall was demonstrated by his weekly Friday visits to London to discuss 
issues which would arise in the coming week, his occasional visits to brief the Prime 
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Minister or Foreign Secretary, and his attendance at OPD(E) meetings, commitments in 
Brussels permitting.25  This was an important exercise as it ensured he knew exactly what 
London was thinking and, when matters came up in IGC discussions, could move the 
negotiations in the desired direction (although this was dependent on clear instructions). In 
advancing the UK line, Kerr was primarily supported by John de Fonblanque, Counsellor 
for political and institutional affairs.  His role extended to membership of the Friends of the 
Presidency26 and Antici Groups27, and to being the UK official note-taker during the IGC, 
as well as at European Council meetings.28 
In contrast to the massive interdepartmental machinery which co-ordinated policy on 
EPU, the EMU discussions were handled by a more select group.  There were contacts at 
various levels involving the Treasury, the FCO, Cabinet Office, and Bank of England 
(BoE). While the Cabinet Office was (and is) essentially neutral, the Treasury was not as 
enthusiastic towards Europe as the FCO.  Whereas the FCO was essentially in favour of 
EMU largely due to the fear of being left out, no Treasury Minister was in favour of 
EMU.29  The key Treasury official was the government’s personal representative on the 
IGC-EMU, Sir Nigel Wicks, who was the Second Permanent Secretary.  The ‘Wicks 
Group’30 played an important role in co-ordinating and formulating government policy in the 
run-up to the IGC, but once the talks commenced met less often, because there was 
insufficient time for such an elaborate policy structure.31   Its role involved policy-making 
because decisions were taken in the Treasury, and not the Cabinet Office. Within the 
Treasury the key group dealing with the monetary statutes and the role of the BoE was led 
by Paul Gray, the Under-Secretary in the Monetary Division, and was important in 
formulating the UK Hard European Currency Unit plan between September and December 
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1990.  It did not, however, have a regular timetable or fixed membership: those 
represented might include other interested parts of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the 
Cabinet Office, FCO, and UKRep.32  Otherwise, the Treasury’s legal adviser, Mark 
Blythe, played a crucial role in providing legal input to both Hecu text and the EMU opt-
out.33 
Significantly, the BoE’s role during the IGC negotiations extended to working with 
other Central Banks on the European Central Bank Statute, and being involved with the 
work in the EC Monetary Committee, the latter of which resulted in detailed discussions 
with the Treasury, and to a lesser extent FCO, on the non-Central Bank content of the 
Treaty.34  It played no direct part in the EMU personal representative meetings, not even 
having an observer present.  BoE non-presence was because of a sense that it had its own 
part to play on the Central Banking front and there was a question over what role it could, 
or would, play at the negotiating table given that Central Bankers did not have any legal 
locus there. This differed from the Bundesbank who made a point of attending EMU 
meetings.  Some BoE officials considered it would be useful to have an observer present 
(not necessarily a senior official), as a lot of Central Banks did, to ensure full 
communication on events.  This, however, was not accepted because the preferred solution 
was to have a clean break. While BoE officials believed no problems arose from its non-
attendance, there was a consideration that it would not have been able to influence the UK 
line even if present. This was a result of the political decision to separate the UK from the 
majority position in favour of EMU. 
Where BoE opinion differed from the Treasury, it was not able to convince the latter of 
its views during discussions in London.  It argued that the supervisory functions of the ECB, 
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as outlined in Article 105(6) and Chapter V, Article 25, of the Protocol on the ECB, 
should have had a more positive provision within the Treaty than that eventually provided 
for.35  The rather tortuous wording of Article 25 stressed that if the Council of Ministers 
decided at some point in the future, that circumstances warranted  a specific supervisory 
role being given to the ECB, they could pass legislation to provide it with such authority.  It 
was a negative rather than positive provision, resulting in a split between the Treasury and 
the BoE.  Some Member States, including the UK and France, were somewhat nervous 
that they were ceding a considerable degree of influence to the ECB, and therefore wished 
to limit the range of activities over which it had such independence. They considered that to 
give it responsibility for supervision at the European level was too extensive a range of 
powers, and accordingly it was extremely unlikely that the BoE would have exerted 
influence at the European negotiating table.36 
 
II 
The Politics of Trust: Foreign Policy and the European Parliament 
While the European Secretariat and OPD(E) helped outline broad policy objectives, a 
great deal of power rested with the individual government departments which controlled 
particular policies.  As noted, the FCO exerted the greater influence on European affairs 
during the IGC, especially within the EPU negotiations, not least because of Hurd’s 
chairmanship of OPD(E) and presence at Foreign Affairs Councils, while he too had a 
greater say within Cabinet.37  Although he only received 38 votes in the second ballot of the 
November 1990 Conservative leadership contest, they comprised many key figures who 
were, or subsequently became, Cabinet Ministers.38  These developments provided Hurd 
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with wider authority to explore possible alliances with other Member States during the 
IGC.  In addition, the FCO recovered some of the ground lost to Number 10 during the 
1980s, while at a Ministerial level the two significant individuals, Hurd and the Minister of 
State, Tristan Garel-Jones,39 were both committed Europhiles.  This contrasted with the 
more Eurosceptic teams at the Treasury (Norman Lamont and Francis Maude) and the 
DfE (Michael Howard and Eric Forth).  Kenneth Baker at the Home Office and Peter 
Lilley at the DTI also were sceptical. 
Within the FCO the key meeting was chaired by the Assistant Under-Secretary for EC 
affairs, Michael Jay.40  The group’s purpose was to resolve disputes within the FCO on 
issues relating to the broad aspects of the IGC, and therefore it was a policy co-ordinating 
group dealing with business management, rather than a policy-making group.  In terms of 
Ministerial linkage the group worked through the FCO Minister of State with responsibility 
for EC affairs, Tristan Garel-Jones,41 and Hurd.  Of the two, Garel-Jones remained in 
closest touch with the negotiations and with the official co-ordinating mechanisms.42  Policy-
making was divided between issues which had an internal and external impact on the EC.  
Internal issues came under the control of European Community Department (Internal) 
(ECD(I)), headed by Michael Arthur, while an IGC unit was established within it to 
distribute Member States’ proposals around Whitehall and to produce an agenda before, 
and a checklist of action points after, each meeting of the Jay Group. External issues, in 
particular security policy, came under the control of the European Community Department 
(External) (ECD(E)) and Security Policy Department,43 headed by Emyr Jones Parry and 
Stephen Gomersall respectively.  Negotiating points were then subject to scrutiny by FCO 
legal advisers, particularly the Deputy Legal Adviser, Martin Eaton. 
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At a tactical level the influence of the FCO within the negotiations was particularly 
apparent on CFSP and the EP, where it was the dominant player within Whitehall, despite 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD)  being involved in the former.44  The Europhile nature of the 
FCO, and Major’s preparedness to trust Hurd to negotiate policy, meant that it was not a 
coincidence that the UK’s position within the CFSP dossier was one of constructive 
engagement, while it also acquiesced to an increase in the power of the EP.  The former 
was a direct result of the government’s intrinsic importance to CFSP; any agreement 
without the UK would have been virtually worthless, while the question of providing the EP 
with a co-decision power was not perceived to raise major matters of principle in domestic 
UK politics.45 
On CFSP the UK eventually advanced a text46 in conjunction with Italy on 4 October 
1991 which was a direct attempt to challenge both the Franco-German alliance within the 
negotiations and a means of countering any future federalist aspirations in this policy 
arena.47 The benefit to the UK was the demonstration to other Member States that its 
concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which was firmly attached to 
NATO, was supported by another Member State.  Hurd’s role was crucial, harbouring a 
particular fondness for Italy having worked as a diplomat in Rome between 1960-63.  At a 
domestic level backbench MPs were less aware of the government’s diplomacy, being 
more concerned about social policy and EMU.48  But while the text was influential in the 
final Maastricht outcome, as the government managed to secure that the special relationship 
between Western Europe and North America was a key element of the European identity, 
the UK conceded that ‘the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence 
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policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’,49 which  represented a significant 
concession on the UK’s pre-IGC position against a common defence. 
Just as on CFSP, the government shifted tact from its initial broadside within the EP 
negotiations.  Based on a belief that there was no requirement to alter the existing range of 
legislative acts, it was therefore not convinced of the necessity to introduce a co-decision 
procedure.50  Despite the twin preference of increasing the non-legislative role of the EP 
and strengthening national parliaments,51 London indicated that if co-decision was going to 
be included then it would be more palatable if it covered areas which were subject to the 
existing co-operation procedure.52  Domestically, the significant factor was that the co-
decision question was hardly raised in the June 1991 Parliamentary debate, the purpose of 
which was to examine the government’s negotiating position.53  A combination of 
Parliamentary interest being focused on other topics and the greater authority empowered 
in Hurd to negotiate on behalf of the government, influenced the UK’s preparedness to give 
the EP veto powers in certain policy areas, including the environment, while simultaneously 
advocating an increase in the EP’s powers for the internal market.54 Flexibility on internal 
market provisions was influenced by primary decisions having already been taken and, 
therefore, only secondary issues needed to be solved. 
UK pliability was demonstrated at the start of the Maastricht European Council by 
Major agreeing to the introduction of the co-decision,55 primarily because he wanted to 
demonstrate both his commitment to the meeting and personal desire for agreement.  It was 
perceived as an act of good faith by other Member States and, therefore, in offering 
movement on co-decision he expected assistance in obtaining other UK objectives.  Both 
this development and movement on CFSP was influenced by the ability of Major and Hurd 
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to resolve policy with little influence coming from other Cabinet Ministers, or the wider 
Parliamentary Party.  Yet where policy was subject to wider Cabinet influence, the 
resolution of differences became a more complex matter.  Ministers dealing with specific 
portfolios could display a strong command of detail relevant to their particular field of 
competence, but were less sure-footed with issues which involved a wider reference.  
Hence, while UK acceptance of the co-decision procedure contradicted the natural 
Eurosceptic instincts of Baker, Howard, Lamont and Lilley, their insufficient knowledge of 
this policy area meant that they did not raise objections within Cabinet. 
 
Knowledge is Power: Social Policy 
Despite the Foreign Office’s remit encompassing the majority of IGC policy, it was not able 
to determine UK preferences on social policy because the DfE took particular 
responsibility in this connection, which placed the Secretary of State, Michael Howard, in a 
particularly strong position.56  This, combined with the fact that it was ‘easier’ for MPs to 
unite behind social policy rather than other more complex IGC topics, such as foreign 
policy, interior affairs and institutional reform, helped raise Howard’s position within 
Cabinet.  Significantly, because Major was younger, more inexperienced, and therefore felt 
himself to be primes inter pares, rather than someone who towered over the rest, he was 
not able to disregard the views of Ministers who were likely to accede to senior positions, 
and even possibly challenge for the leadership - as well as representing particular sections 
of support within the wider Parliamentary Party.  Hence, Howard proved to be a notable 
influence on government policy, which was also borne out of the fact that he had been 
appointed to the DfE eleven months earlier and consequently had a more commanding 
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grasp of that portfolio than other Ministers at the commencement of the negotiations (see 
table 1). 
Table 1 
Government Ministers length of tenure at the end of 199157 
 
Name Department/Position Complete months in post 
1. Lord Mackay Lord Chancellor 51 
2. Tom King Defence 28 
3. John Wakeham Energy 28 
4. Antony Newton Social Security 28 
5. John Gummer Agriculture 28 
6. Peter Brooke Northern Ireland 28 
7. Douglas Hurd Foreign Office 26 
8. Michael Howard Employment 24 
9. David Hunt Wales 20 
10. Peter Lilley Trade and Industry 18 
11. Kenneth Clarke Education 14 
12. John Macgregor Leader H/Commons 14 
13. William Waldegrave Health 14 
14. John Major Prime Minister 13 
15. Norman Lamont Treasury 13 
16. Kenneth Baker Home Office 13 
17. Chris Patten Chllr of Duchy of Lancaster 13 
18. Michael Heseltine Environment 13 
19. Lord Waddington Leader H/Lords 13 
20. Malcolm Rifkind Transport 13 
21. Ian Lang Scotland 13 
22. David Mellor Treasury (Chief Secretary) 13 
Ministers crucial to IGC negotiations Ministers important to IGC negotiations 
 
While the Ministerial team within the DfE was broadly Eurosceptic, Howard 
monopolised debate and the organisation of policy development.58  He was able both to 
utilise the resources of the Department to defend his policy line, and convince Cabinet and 
Parliamentary colleagues of the pitfalls of other Member States proposals.  Moreover, he 
was less interested in participating in discussions with his continental counterparts.  
Accordingly, the FCO was not influential within the social policy negotiations, despite giving 
tactical advice about how the government could best play its hand.  This became 
particularly apparent during the endgame of the negotiations, when the combination of 
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Howard’s strength within the Party, and London’s long-standing antipathy towards the 
regulation of employment policy by Brussels, ensured that social policy emerged into a 
crunch issue.59  In particular, Howard threatened resignation if the government accepted a 
Social Chapter inside the Treaty,60 while immediately prior to Maastricht he presented 
Cabinet with a text outlining what he considered would constitute an acceptable agreement 
on social policy at Maastricht, what could be conceded if pressed, and what was not 
acceptable.61  Its significance lay not in content, rather in that he was able to dictate policy, 
which suggested Cabinet arithmetic favoured Howard. 
Thus, maintaining Party unity, in particular that of the Cabinet, and not wanting to 
provoke a seism by forcing Howard to resign, proved to be the crucial factor in defining 
government policy.  Major was aware that Howard’s presence outside Cabinet would 
undermine his own position, possibly sparking a further leadership contest.  Indeed, the 
Right wing of the Party warned Major about conceding extra powers to Brussels on 4 
November.62  The outcome of the social policy negotiations was a refusal by London to 
accept even a watered down Social Chapter at the December 1991 Maastricht European 
Council.  The consequence of this was for a Social Agreement to be attached to the Treaty, 
backed up by a Social Protocol.  The other eleven Member States could, with the 
exception of the UK, take acts and decisions among themselves and apply them as far as 
they were concerned.  Any resulting acts would not be applicable to the UK (in principle), 
and implementation costs would not be borne by UK tax-payers. 
This demonstrated that individual Cabinet Ministers who controlled portfolios directly 
relevant to the IGC were able to translate highly-crafted preferences into government 
policy.  Significantly, while seventeen Cabinet Ministers were either Europhiles or had 
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neutral views on Europe, four of the remaining five Eurosceptic Ministers controlled 
portfolios pertinent to the IGC (see table 2).  By contrast, the vast majority of Europhiles 
were based in departments which were not crucial to IGC policy.   But among the 
Eurosceptic Ministers, the Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, was less of a dominant figure 
within his own departmental remit, namely JHA.  This was because a greater number of 
actors exercised an influence in this policy area, in particular the FCO, European 
Secretariat and UKRep, which reflected Baker’s lack of influence within Cabinet: he did 
not represent any significant faction of the Conservative Party and was also in the twilight of 
his career. In his memoirs he recalled that he ‘urged’ both Major and Hurd, on two 
separate occasions, to secure a renegotiation of Article 8A of the Single European Act 
(SEA) to ensure the UK retained control over its immigration and frontier controls. But 
both Major and Hurd ‘...felt unable to raise the whole interpretation of Article 8A and the 
Declaration’, leaving Baker ‘..very disappointed that this fundamental European challenge 
to our sovereignty was never raised at the Maastricht meeting’.63  Baker was effectively 
sidelined, his views - and personal position - not considered significant enough to merit 
policy change. 
Indeed, the advancement of a UK text within the field of JHA arose out of Kerr’s 
consideration that it was essential for a proposal to be developed as a means of shaping 
and influencing the debate, which contrasted with London’s position on social policy, 
whereby it chose not to advance texts.  Accordingly, by putting forward proposals the 
government acknowledged that there was a need for increased co-operation within this 
policy area, which had been initially signposted in the December 1990 Rome mandate,64 
although UK preferences were basically limited to the formalisation of activities previously 
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carried out on an intergovernmental basis.65   The Home Office’s initial lack of influence 
reflected the absence of a European Community Unit within the department, with one finally 
being created in February 1991 after the advancement of the UK text.66 
Table 2 
Cabinet Ministers’ Positions on Europe during IGC Negotiations  
 
Relevance  




‘Pro’ ‘Neutral’ ‘Anti’ 
 




Douglas Hurd •  
(Foreign Secretary) 
•  Chris Patten 
(Chllr of Duchy of 
Lancaster) 
•  John Major (PM) •  Michael Howard 
(Employment) 




 Tom King •  
(Defence) 
•  Kenneth Baker 
      (Home Secretary) 
•  Peter Lilley 




•  John Gummer 
(Agriculture) 
•  Michael Heseltine 
(Environment) 
 









•  Kenneth Clarke 
(Education) 
•  David Hunt  (Wales) 
Ian Lang •  
(Scotland) 
Malcolm Rifkind •  
(Transport) 
•  William Waldegrave 
(Health) 
•  Peter Brooke  
   (N. Ireland) 
•  Lord Mackay 
      (Lord Chancellor) 
•  David Mellor  
(Chief Secretary) 
•  Antony Newton 
      (Social Security) 
•  John Wakeham 
(Energy) 
•  Lord Waddington 
(Leader H/Lords) 
Total 10 7 5 
Source: Authors interpretation from interviews and correspondence. 
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Limited Influence: EMU 
In contrast to the dramatic manner by which Howard determined the UK negotiating 
position within the social policy debate, Lamont’s influence upon the EMU dossier at both 
the domestic and EC level was less apparent.  This was despite the Treasury being the 
predominant department on EMU within Whitehall, with the FCO being the only other 
significant voice.  Crucially, a consensus existed within Cabinet on the necessity for a UK 
opt-out from the third stage of EMU.  This meant that Lamont’s Eurosceptic outlook did 
not necessitate the fashioning of a policy radically different from that advocated by other 
Ministers.  Moreover, whereas Major was both prepared to trust Hurd to conduct the 
negotiations on EPU and resigned to Howard’s influence on social policy, he was less 
inclined to take an aloof position on EMU.  As a former Chancellor, with a preference for 
the detailed work of the Treasury, his natural instinct led him towards taking active 
involvement within the EMU dossier.  
This was notably apparent during an informal meeting in the margins of the June 1991 
Luxembourg European Council with Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer, Ruud Lubbers, 
François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl (Lamont himself was not present, having been 
detained at Westminster for a three-line whip on dangerous dogs!67).  The Prime Minister 
informed them he would not sign an agreement at Maastricht if the EMU talks created a 
legally binding obligation for the UK to join a single currency, and wanted an undertaking 
that if such a situation arose then the UK would have an opt-out, which the other leaders 
agreed to (although not in Treaty text). This differed from a specific opt-out as it provided 
the government with an ability to proceed to EMU, but with no obligation to do so. A 
straightforward exemption from EMU, which would have been much easier to secure, was 
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never its aim.  This was finally achieved at Maastricht, although this was done so by Major 
after Lamont walked out of the Finance Ministers meeting in response to the Dutch 
chairman, Wim Kok, examining the text of the UK protocol. 
Yet, the pursuit of an opt-out reduced the UK’s influence at the EC negotiating table, 
because by focusing so exclusively on it the government reduced its ability to keep abreast 
of other areas of the negotiations.  However, this did not appear to bother the government, 
partly because of the Chancellor’s scepticism towards the whole process.  His view was 
based on a consideration that it would be difficult for EMU to be reached by 1999, while 
he believed the government would take a definite decision not to participate in EMU.  
Distrust and distaste for the whole monetary project by Lamont was emphasised by his 
refusal to sign the Treaty on European Union in February 1992 because he did not consider 
it worthy of signing as it firmly stated a single currency would be established - a 
development he was opposed to.  This resulted in the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
Francis Maude, signing it instead. The government’s negative stance towards EMU 
effected BoE efforts to persuade Central Banks of the merits of UK proposals, as well as 
to the efforts of Treasury and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) negotiators. 
Perversely, these very negotiators had a greater ability to engage than the teams which lead 
on EPU. The Wicks-Kerr team were more aware of the government’s objectives than was 
the case on EPU, where there tended to be a mindfulness only of what it did not want 
(which, we may infer, was practically everything).  Because EMU was a Treasury 
negotiation, with very little influence from outside departments other than the FCO, it was 
far easier to resolve a Whitehall line. In contrast, if policy needed clarification on EPU, 
numerous departments could have a viewpoint. This resulted in a slower decision-making 
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process and, because many government Ministers were involved on EPU, when they met 
to discuss IGC issues they often ended up focusing on non-IGC issues which they 
considered to be more important. The possibility for this happened far less on EMU, but 
because the political tone of the government was against the project, the EMU negotiators 
were just as handicapped. 
In effect, London’s success was limited to specific, detailed points, notably the inclusion 
of ‘gross errors’ in Article 104c(2), which ensured that the excessive deficit procedure 
should only occasionally come into being by taking account of cyclical developments.  
Otherwise, it obtained the inclusion of the ‘ways and means’ facility within the EMU opt-
out text,68 while on EPU it achieved the inconspicuous inclusion of the Barber Protocol69 
alongside a commitment to subsidiarity within the Treaty and not the preamble.  By 
contrast, the Treaty confirmed the irreversibility of the process by setting a deadline of 1 
January 1999 for the commencement of Stage 3 of EMU (Article 109j), thereby 




It is evident that the IGC negotiations on EPU and EMU were handled in different ways.  
The EMU talks were simpler, with very little need for inter-departmental co-ordination 
because of the singular nature of the subject.  But the government’s preference not be 
committed to a single currency reduced the influence negotiators had in the IGC, both at an 
official and Ministerial level, the latter being the result of Lamont’s scepticism towards 
EMU.  In contrast, within EPU there existed a greater consultation procedure, involving 
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numerous government departments because of the broad nature of the subjects discussed 
during the IGC.  Whereas policy on EMU was essentially decided within the Treasury, 
EPU decisions were channelled through the European Secretariat. But, because topics 
touched on a greater number of departments, and because decisions were often subject to 
prolonged, and personal discussion, the government was not always clear as to what its 
position was on the numerous points the EPU IGC debated. In addition, as the EPU 
negotiations were more wide-ranging, and as the government had its eye on particular 
issues such as social policy, it did not give proper attention to all aspects of the negotiations. 
During the IGC, certain trends were apparent.   First, government Ministers did not 
consider the IGC to be their top priority. This tended to be the general election and 
maintaining the unity of the Conservative Party.  The situation reflected a certain 
‘ambivalence within the Conservative leadership about closer European integration’.71  
While broad trends in government policy towards the IGC were clear, such as an EMU 
ticket not involving any compulsion to join, it was not forthcoming on other issues. One of 
the reasons for this was because if agreement had been taken within Cabinet at an earlier 
stage, on subjects such as the powers of the EP, it would have been highly likely the 
ensuing decision would have been subject to even further debate over whether it was the 
correct choice, or not. Party management was therefore an important aspect of the 
negotiations.  Vagueness was the order of the day for much of the IGC because Major 
constantly asked for more time, both domestically and at a European level.   He did not 
want to bind himself to any agreements at an early stage of the discussions, which may have 
been difficult to disentangle from at a later stage. By waiting until the last minute, before 
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making concessions on certain points, he considered the government’s negotiating hand 
would be  maximised, even though it had no aces to play. 
The driving force behind this strategy was Major’s position in relation to his fellow 
Cabinet members. Major was primes inter pares, partly because he did not want to 
dominate meetings as such a policy had the scent of Thatcher’s downfall, and partly 
because he was incapable of exerting dominance even if he so desired because of the splits 
among Cabinet Ministers and the Parliamentary Party on European issues.  The leader of 
the government was effectively a prisoner of his fellow Cabinet Ministers.  He could not 
lead policy or present deals achieved with other EC governments, without full consultation. 
Some members of the Cabinet had greater power than their position merited, most notably 
Michael Howard, who managed to raise the tempo on social policy. 
Such developments meant clear policy objectives were not always forthcoming for the 
government’s EPU negotiators in particular. They were not tied to a government line, but 
were instead tied to the absence of a government line on many policy issues (particularly 
EPU). This was not a reflection of a failure of policy co-ordination: many meetings were 
arranged, but at Ministerial level they were often cancelled, or hijacked by other topics 
which were deemed to be more important.  On EMU, which was principally driven by the 
Treasury, it was easier for a negotiating line to be established and translated into a set of 
instructions for the negotiators. On EPU, where issues impinged on numerous departments, 
and where there existed differences on policy objectives, for example with Chris Patten 
favouring a softer UK line on social policy, and Howard desiring the reverse, the 
government did not manage to establish a clear set of policy objectives, not least because 
of domestic political opinion. 
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While Kerr and Hadley were broadly aware of Ministers’ desires on EPU issues, how 
those objectives would, or could, be won was not clear.  Furthermore, there existed a 
naiveté at Ministerial level as to how the negotiations could be conducted. There was a lack 
of awareness as to the necessity for the UK to offer some form of flexibility by accepting 
policies which, although unpalatable, meant that other key objectives would be more easily 
obtained.  The result was the attainment of a deal at Maastricht72 which broadly satisfied 
the government’s demands.  In the process of the negotiations, the very fact the UK made 
headway equally relied on the skill of Hadley at the UK end and Kerr at the Brussels end, 
and on the Wicks-Kerr team on EMU, although the latter were made more aware of what 
was acceptable or not. This is not to say the agreements were necessarily a success for the 
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